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KEEPING SECRETS:  
THE UNSETTLED LAW OF JUDGE-MADE 
EXCEPTIONS TO GRAND JURY SECRECY 
H. BRENT MCKNIGHT, JR.† 
ABSTRACT 
  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) functionally binds 
everyone who is present during grand jury proceedings (except 
witnesses) to secrecy. But questions arise when courts are asked to 
make exceptions to grand jury secrecy outside those enumerated in the 
rule, such as exceptions for Congress or for the release of historically 
significant grand jury records.  
  This Note examines the propriety of judge-made exceptions to grand 
jury secrecy. Contrary to some courts authorizing disclosure outside of 
Rule 6(e), this Note argues that the text and development of Rule 6(e), 
along with limitations on courts’ inherent authority over grand jury 
procedure, caution against this practice. The tension between the 
current practice of some courts and the apparent meaning of Rule 6(e) 
renders the law of grand jury secrecy unsettled. To clarify the law, the 
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules should add a residual 
exception to Rule 6(e) that would not only give courts flexibility and 
discretion but also a clear source of authority on which to authorize 
disclosures. 
INTRODUCTION 
The grand jury, which traces its history back to twelfth-century 
English common law,1 traditionally functions as both a sword and a 
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 1.  See Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its 
Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 5–12 (1996) (tracing the history of the grand 
jury from the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 to the 1600s and its adoption in the United States). 
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shield.2 As a shield, the grand jury protects the innocent from 
unmerited criminal charges.3 By contrast, the grand jury functions as a 
sword by using its subpoena power and the ability to grant immunity 
to witnesses to help prosecutors investigate potential crimes.4 Grand 
jury proceedings are largely obscured from public view by longstanding 
secrecy rules. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) provides a 
list of people who, “[u]nless these rules provide otherwise, . . . must not 
disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury.”5 The burden of 
secrecy falls not only upon the grand jurors themselves, but also onto 
interpreters, court reporters, operators of recording devices, 
transcribers, government attorneys, and those to whom disclosure is 
made pursuant to certain exceptions to the rule.6 Functionally, it binds 
everyone present during grand jury proceedings, except for witnesses.7 
The rule attempts to prevent targets of investigation from fleeing, to 
protect the freedom and independence of the grand jurors’ 
deliberations, to protect against “subornation of perjury or tampering 
with the witnesses,” to encourage free disclosure by witnesses, and “to 
protect [the] innocent accused . . . from disclosure of the fact that he 
has been under investigation.”8  
But questions arise when courts are asked to make exceptions to 
grand jury secrecy outside those enumerated in the rule. For example, 
in McKeever v. Barr,9 lawyer and historian Stuart McKeever10 
 
 2.  See, e.g., SARA SUN BEALE, WILLIAM C. BRYSON, TAYLOR H. CRABTREE, JAMES E. 
FELMAN, MICHAEL J. ELSTON & KATHERINE EARLE YANES, GRAND JURY LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 1:7 (2d ed. 1997), Westlaw GJURLAW (last updated Nov. 2019) (discussing the 
grand jury as both a sword and shield); Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the 
Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1273 (2006) [hereinafter 
Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor] (same). 
 3.  See BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, § 1:7 (saying that after an individual is accused of 
criminal conduct, the grand jury “determine[s] whether there is sufficient evidentiary support to 
justify holding the accused for trial on each charge”). But see id. § 1:1 (“In many states the grand 
jury is no longer the principal pretrial check against unfounded charges.”). 
 4.  See id. § 1:7 (describing the grand jury’s investigative role as a sword when it acts “to 
discover and attack criminal conduct”). 
 5.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B). 
 6.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B)(i)–(vii). 
 7.  See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 8.  MICHAEL A. FOSTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45456, FEDERAL GRAND JURY SECRECY 
6 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 
681 n.6 (1958)); see also BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, § 5:1 (identifying additional rationales such 
as “preventing prejudicial leaks of information to potential defendants”). 
 9.  McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 597 (2020). 
 10.  Bio, STUART A. MCKEEVER, AUTHOR, http://www.stumckeever.com/bio [https://perma.cc/ 
7DX4-JXJP].  
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petitioned the District Court for the District of Columbia for the 
release of grand jury records he believed would aid his research into 
the unsolved disappearance of Columbia University Professor Jesús de 
Galíndez Suárez in 1956.11 When Galíndez disappeared, some in the 
news media suggested that Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the 
Dominican Republic, had kidnapped and murdered Galíndez in 
retaliation for Galíndez’s criticism of the Trujillo regime.12  
McKeever believed that “John Joseph Frank, a former FBI agent 
and CIA lawyer who later worked for Trujillo,” had orchestrated the 
disappearance.13 In 1957, a grand jury indicted Frank for violations of 
the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 but did not indict him for 
any crimes related to Galíndez’s disappearance and murder.14 At trial, 
the prosecution introduced evidence implying “that [Frank] was 
connected with [Galíndez’s] disappearance.”15 On appeal, the court 
reversed Frank’s conviction and remanded his case for a new trial on 
the basis that this evidence was too prejudicial to have been properly 
admitted.16 However, the discussion of the evidence at trial and on 
appeal supported McKeever’s theory of Frank’s involvement and the 
possibility that the grand jury records would hold even more 
information.  
The district court held that although Rule 6(e) did not authorize 
McKeever’s request, the court had inherent authority to go beyond the 
rule “to disclose historically significant grand jury matters.”17 Even so, 
the district court denied the request as overbroad.18 In a split decision 
on appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed but on different grounds.19 The 
D.C. Circuit ruled that the exceptions in Rule 6(e) are an exhaustive 
 
 11.  McKeever, 920 F.3d at 843.  
 12.  See id. (“News media at the time believed Galíndez, a critic of the regime of Dominican 
Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo, was kidnapped and flown to the Dominican Republic and there 
murdered by Trujillo’s agents.”); see also Frank v. United States, 262 F.2d 695, 696 (D.C. Cir. 
1958) (“[Galíndez’s] disappearance in circumstances that suggested murder was a matter of 
common knowledge.”). 
 13.  McKeever, 920 F.3d at 843. 
 14.  Id. at 843–44. 
 15.  Frank, 262 F.2d at 696. 
 16.  Id. at 697. 
 17.  McKeever, 920 F.3d at 843. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
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list,20 and moreover, district courts have no inherent authority to order 
disclosure outside the confines of the rule.21 
Although access to sixty-year-old grand jury materials for 
historical research into a little-known case may seem innocuous, 
allowing judge-made exceptions authorizing disclosure, especially 
within the D.C. Circuit, would have had broader implications. For 
example, Rule 6(e) contains no explicit exception for Congress.22 
Unless courts have inherent authority to disclose information outside 
of the rule, Congress might be denied access to grand jury materials, 
even if those materials would be useful to a congressional investigation.  
This tension between grand jury secrecy and Congress’s desire for 
information came to the fore at the conclusion of Special Counsel 
Robert Mueller’s investigation.23 After completing his investigation, 
Mueller submitted a confidential final report to Attorney General 
William Barr.24 Congressional leaders requested the full report, 
ostensibly because the four-page summary provided by the attorney 
general was insufficient.25 Barr agreed to provide the report, but only 
after making redactions, including of information subject to Rule 
 
 20.  See id. at 845 (“The only rule to [allow disclosure] is Rule 6(e)(3). Rules 6(e)(2) and (3) 
together explicitly require secrecy in all other circumstances.”). 
 21.  Id. at 850. 
 22.  FOSTER, supra note 8, at 1–2. 
 23.  Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed Robert Mueller as special counsel 
to investigate possible ties between the Trump campaign and the Russian government in 
connection with Russian interference in the 2016 election as well as whether President Trump or 
others obstructed Mueller’s investigation. See Rod J. Rosenstein, Acting Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Just., Ord. No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference 
with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters (May 17, 2017), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/967231/download [https://perma.cc/E8VJ-2LW8]. 
 24.  ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN 
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/
storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC55-NMKZ]. Confidentiality was required. 28 C.F.R. 
§ 600.8(c) (2020) (requiring “a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination 
decisions reached by the Special Counsel”). 
 25.  See Jeff Mason & Susan Heavey, Democrats Push for Mueller Report to Congress by 
Next Week, Republicans Resist, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2019, 9:41 AM), https://reut.rs/2TBe56I 
[https://perma.cc/6KSC-VTCB] (describing Democratic leaders’ push for Barr to release the 
report). 
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6(e).26 The House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed the full report, but 
Barr ignored the order.27 
Around the same time Congress and the Department of Justice 
began to fight over the report’s release, the D.C. Circuit handed down 
its decision denying McKeever’s request for grand jury materials.28 
McKeever foreclosed the possibility that Chief Judge Beryl Howell, 
who presided over the Mueller grand jury, could order materials to be 
disclosed to Congress outside of an enumerated exception to Rule 6(e). 
It was not until the House began an impeachment inquiry that Chief 
Judge Howell authorized disclosure of some of the materials under an 
exception that allows disclosure preliminarily to or in connection with 
a judicial proceeding.29 The D.C. Circuit affirmed.30 Without the 
impeachment inquiry, Congress would likely not have had access to 
those materials. 
However, not all courts agree with McKeever’s reasoning and 
outcome. Indeed, a circuit split exists over whether judges may 
authorize disclosure of grand jury materials outside the bounds of Rule 
6(e).31 This Note explores such judge-made exceptions to grand jury 
 
 26.  Letter from William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Lindsey Graham, 
Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary & Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, House Comm. on the 
Judiciary 1 (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1153021/download [https://
perma.cc/WXB9-Y8G9].  
 27.  See David Morgan, Second Deadline for DOJ To Give Congress Full Mueller Report 
Expires, REUTERS (May 6, 2019, 9:19 AM), https://reut.rs/2vCKuAv [https://perma.cc/7RZA-
SMW6] (reporting on Barr’s noncompliance). 
 28.  See McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (decided Apr. 5, 2019), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 597 (2020); Mason & Heavey, supra note 25 (noting Congress’s push for release 
of documents from the Mueller investigation in March 2019). 
 29.  In re Application of Comm. on the Judiciary, 414 F. Supp. 3d 129, 137, 147, 182 (D.D.C. 
2019), aff’d, 951 F.3d 589 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. granted, No. 19-1328,  2020 WL 3578680 (U.S. July 
2, 2020). 
 30.  Comm. on the Judiciary, 951 F.3d at 603. 
 31.  Some circuits, like the McKeever court, hold that courts cannot make disclosures outside 
the bounds of the rule. See, e.g., Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226, 1241 (11th Cir. 2020) (en 
banc) (“Rule 6(e) is exhaustive. District courts . . . do not possess the inherent, supervisory power 
to order the release of grand jury records in instances not covered by the rule.”), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 20-224 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2020); United States v. McDougal, 559 F.3d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 
2009) (same); In re Grand Jury 89-4-72, 932 F.2d 481, 488 (6th Cir. 1991) (same).  
 Other circuits disagree and hold that courts have inherent authority to authorize the 
disclosure. See, e.g., Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Rule 6(e)(3)(E) 
does not displace [the district courts’] inherent power. It merely identifies a permissive list of 
situations where that power can be used.”); In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]here 
are certain ‘special circumstances’ in which release of grand jury records is appropriate even 
outside of the boundaries of [Rule 6(e)(3)].” (quoting In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489, 494 (2d Cir. 
1973) (supplemental opinion))); cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2005) 
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secrecy.32 Contrary to some courts’ practice of authorizing disclosures 
outside of Rule 6(e), this Note argues that the text and development of 
Rule 6(e), along with limitations on courts’ inherent authority over 
grand jury procedure, show that courts lack clear authority to do so. Of 
course, there may be circumstances where policy considerations would 
justify the disclosure.33 The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules 
should clarify the law and provide for these circumstances by adding a 
residual exception to Rule 6(e) that would not only give courts 
flexibility and discretion but also a clear source of authority on which 
to authorize these disclosures. 
Part I introduces the grand jury, focusing on its unique position as 
a quasi-judicial and quasi-executive, but ultimately independent, body 
 
(holding that district courts have inherent power to impose a secrecy requirement even when Rule 
6(e) does not provide for it). 
 32.  Plenty has been written on grand jury secrecy. This Note’s primary contribution, 
however, is its close analysis of Rule 6(e) and its proposed amendment to the rule in light of the 
tension between the rule and current practice. For a discussion of other topics, see generally 
FOSTER, supra note 8; R. Michael Cassidy, Silencing Grand Jury Witnesses, 91 IND. L.J. 823 
(2016); Nicole Smith Futrell, Visibly (Un)Just: The Optics of Grand Jury Secrecy and Police 
Violence, 123 DICK. L. REV. 1 (2018); Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand 
Jury: Converging Streams of Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573 
(1994); Kadish, supra note 1; Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor, supra note 2; Niki Kuckes, The 
Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2004); William 
B. Lytton, Grand Jury Secrecy—Time for a Reevaluation, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1100 
(1984); John M. Nataro, Grand Jury Secrecy: Prohibitions on Witness Disclosure, 2 NU F. 29 
(1997); Daniel C. Richman, Essay, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 
36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339 (1999); Lori E. Shaw, The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and the False Dichotomy Between Protecting 
National Security and Preserving Grand Jury Secrecy, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 495 (2005); Fred 
A. Bernstein, Note, Behind the Gray Door: Williams, Secrecy, and the Federal Grand Jury, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 563 (1994); M.R.K., Note, Disclosure of Grand Jury Materials to Foreign 
Authorities Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 70 VA. L. REV. 1623 (1984); JoEllen 
Lotvedt, Note, Availability of Civil Remedies Under the Grand Jury Secrecy Rule, 47 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 237 (1997); Andrea M. Nervi, Comment, FRCrP 6(e) and the Disclosure of Documents 
Reviewed by a Grand Jury, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1990); Susan M. Schiappa, Note, Preserving 
the Autonomy and Function of the Grand Jury: United States v. Williams, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 
311 (1993); Alex Thrasher, Comment, Judicial Construction of Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 6(e)—Historical Evolution and Circuit Interpretation Regarding Disclosure of Grand 
Jury Proceedings to Third Parties, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 587 (2018). 
 In addition, there is a recent piece examining the courts’ supervisory authority over grand 
jury procedure. See generally Rebecca Gonzalez-Rivas, Comment, An Institution “at Arm’s 
Length”: Reconsidering Supervisory Power over the Federal Grand Jury, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1647 
(2020). Although that piece and this Note cover many similar topics, the two part ways in several 
respects, especially regarding the clarity of Rule 6(e)’s text and some of the reasons why courts 
may lack inherent authority to create exceptions outside the rule. 
 33.  The policy rationales that would justify disclosure depend largely on the circumstances. 
As a result, this Note has a primarily doctrinal focus.  
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within the legal system. It also examines the development of grand jury 
secrecy as well as introduces Rule 6(e)’s secrecy rule and exceptions. 
Part II examines the text of Rule 6(e), arguing that the rule limits the 
exercise of judicial power to create new exceptions. The language of 
the rule, the detailed and specific nature of the rule’s exceptions, and 
the evolution of the rule over time suggest that Rule 6(e) covers the 
field of grand jury secrecy and departures from it. 
Part III moves beyond the text of the rule to consider judges’ 
inherent authority to regulate grand jury procedure. It argues that 
because of the grand jury’s independence, limitations on courts’ 
inherent authority over grand jury procedure are greater than those on 
courts’ inherent authority to regulate their own proceedings. As a 
result, these limitations indicate courts should be wary of creating 
grand jury procedural rules outside the bounds of Rule 6(e).34 Finally, 
Part IV surveys efforts to amend the rule and proposes that the 
Advisory Committee clarify this area of grand jury procedure by 
adding a residual exception to Rule 6(e).  
I.  BACKGROUND 
The courts’ role in maintaining grand jury secrecy and authorizing 
disclosure is defined, in part, by the unique role the grand jury plays as 
an independent body in the legal system and the way in which long-
standing secrecy rules developed into Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 6(e). This Part surveys both.  
A. The Grand Jury’s Unique Constitutional Role 
The grand jury’s dual sword and shield functions make it a special 
institution in the criminal justice system.35 The grand jury both 
investigates whether there is probable cause that a crime has been 
 
 34.  This Note focuses on federal courts, but the same conclusion may be true of some state 
courts. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Superior Ct., 195 P.3d 588, 589–90 (Cal. 2008) (“[W]e hold that 
California courts do not have a broad inherent power to order disclosure of grand jury materials 
to private litigants . . . . ‘[T]he superior court’s powers to disclose grand jury testimony are only 
those which the Legislature has deemed appropriate.’” (quoting Daily J. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 
979 P.2d 982, 989 (Cal. 1999))); In re 38 Studios Grand Jury, 225 A.3d 224, 239–40 (R.I. 2020) 
(“There is no inherent authority in the Superior Court to disclose grand jury materials beyond 
that which is permitted by the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). 
 35.  See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (“The grand jury occupies 
a unique role in our criminal justice system. It . . . ‘can investigate merely on suspicion that the 
law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.’” (quoting United 
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950))). 
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committed and protects the innocent against “unfounded criminal 
prosecutions.”36 These twin roles are denoted the “investigative” and 
the “indicting” grand jury, respectively.37 The same group of impaneled 
jurors plays both roles. 
The grand jury responds to two branches of government: the 
executive and judiciary.38 As “a tool of the Executive,”39 the 
investigating grand jury has a role “akin to that performed by the 
police.”40 It is a “grand inquest . . . the scope of whose inquiries is not 
to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the 
probable result of the investigation.”41 Procedural and evidentiary 
rules for trials generally do not apply.42 The grand jury neither needs 
probable cause to issue a subpoena43 nor requires authorization from 
the court to begin an investigation or return an indictment.44 Further, 
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to grand jury 
proceedings,45 and many circuits have held that the right to counsel 
does not extend to testifying witnesses.46 In short, the investigating 
grand jury is a powerful tool for scrutinizing potentially criminal 
behavior.47 
 
 36.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686–87 (1972); see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 
1, 16–17 (1973) (stating the grand jury’s “mission is to clear the innocent, no less than to bring to 
trial those who may be guilty”). 
 37.  BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, § 1:7. 
 38.  See Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor, supra note 2, at 1266 (“[T]he federal grand jury 
occupies an uneasy middle ground, operating in the zone between prosecutorial and judicial 
action.”). 
 39.  United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 40.  BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, § 1:7.  
 41.  Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). 
 42.  See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 298 (1991) (“[M]any of the rules and 
restrictions that apply at a trial do not apply in grand jury proceedings. This is especially true of 
evidentiary restrictions.”); cf. United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423 (1983) 
(explaining the grand jury has immense powers to investigate and to self-direct its efforts). 
 43.  R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 297. 
 44.  United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992). 
 45.  Id. at 49. 
 46.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 713 F.2d 616, 617 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) 
(citing United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1974)) (“Grand jury witnesses have no 
right to the presence of counsel in the [grand] jury room during questioning.”); In re Grumbles, 
453 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (citing In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957)) 
(finding a witness’s claim to the right to counsel during grand jury questioning to be meritless). 
 47.  For more information on how typical rules do not apply to grand juries, see Thaddeus 
Hoffmeister, The Grand Jury Legal Advisor: Resurrecting the Grand Jury’s Shield, 98 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1181–82 (2008). 
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In contrast, the indicting grand jury is similar to “a judicial officer 
at a preliminary hearing . . . screening the evidence.”48 The grand jury 
“reviewing an accusation”49 to protect the innocent ostensibly ensures 
justice is done through the grand jury’s work. The grand jury’s 
investigative powers help fulfill this role. The investigative functions 
are “incidents of the judicial power of the United States”50 because the 
grand jury’s subpoena power is derived from the court,51 and such 
investigative powers are often necessary to reveal that a charge is 
unfounded.52 Because the grand jury derives its power from the court, 
“[t]he grand jury is an arm of the court,” and its mention in the Fifth 
Amendment “makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process.”53  
The Constitution guarantees the use of the grand jury in the Fifth 
Amendment,54 but it commits the grand jury neither to the executive 
nor to the judiciary exclusively.55 Instead, the Supreme Court has 
explained that the grand jury “is a constitutional fixture in its own 
right.”56 An independent institution, it responds both to the judicial 
and executive branches but belongs to neither. To fulfill its purpose, 
the grand jury must be “free, within constitutional and statutory limits, 
to operate ‘independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.’”57 
 
 48.  BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, § 1:7. 
 49.  Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor, supra note 2, at 1275. 
 50.  Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 280 (1919). 
 51.  Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor, supra note 2, at 1272. 
 52.  See United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983) (describing the grand 
jury’s broad powers as necessary to fulfill both its investigative and indicting functions). 
 53.  Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617 (1960). Some argue prosecutorial misuse and 
grand jurors passively capitulating to prosecutors’ requests has thwarted this role. See, e.g., BEALE 
ET AL., supra note 2, § 1:1 (“In recent years critics have charged that the grand jury has lost its 
traditional independence and does little more than rubber stamp the prosecutor’s decisions.”); 
Futrell, supra note 32, at 25–26 (discussing the prosecutor’s relationship to the grand jury and 
concluding that “prosecutors have significant control over the direction and outcome of the grand 
jury process, and secrecy serves to obscure the nuance of that control”).  
 54.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”). 
 55.  See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (discussing the grand jury’s position 
in the legal system based on its placement in the Constitution); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering 
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the 
Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1460 (1984) (“[T]he grand jury is not assigned to any 
one of the three branches of government.”). 
 56.  Williams, 504 U.S. at 47 (quoting United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 
1977)). 
 57.  Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 430 (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960)). 
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As Part III discusses, the grand jury’s independent position affects 
judges’ authority to create rules of grand jury procedure.58 
B. Codifying Grand Jury Secrecy in Rule 6(e) 
For the first 140 years of the federal judiciary, there were no 
unified federal procedural rules, and what rules existed were dictated 
primarily by Congress.59 The Court acceded to congressional 
rulemaking, holding that the Necessary and Proper Clause gave 
Congress the power to regulate federal judicial procedure.60 The Court 
generally construed the judiciary’s power narrowly and treated 
Congress’s rules as authoritative.61 Congress continued to be the 
primary source of procedural rules until the 1930s.62  
During this same period of time, federal common law included a 
strong grand jury secrecy norm.63 But some defendants challenged 
grand jury secrecy on grounds that the evidence the grand jury 
considered could not support the indictment.64 To address this, courts 
asserted “discretionary power” to allow parties in some cases to inspect 
grand jury materials to determine an indictment’s validity.65 However, 
courts held that this power should be rarely exercised.66 
In the 1930s, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to create 
uniform rules of civil and criminal procedure.67 The new criminal rules, 
 
 58.  Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor, supra note 2, at 1274 (noting that who controls the 
grand jury bears on the extent to which judges can regulate grand jury procedure). 
 59.  Beale, supra note 55, at 1436. The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Process Act passed 
shortly thereafter are early examples. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; Process Act of 
1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the 
Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 747–48 (2001) (noting that the Process Act came 
quickly after the Judiciary Act to limit judicial discretion over procedure). 
 60.  Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825); see also Pushaw, supra note 59, 
at 752–54 (discussing Wayman, related cases, and the Court’s deference to Congress). 
 61.  See Beale, supra note 55, at 1438–39 (describing the Court’s deference to Congress and 
the few exceptions to it). 
 62.  Id. at 1436. Even so, the only uniform rules were those of equity and of admiralty, which 
the Supreme Court created not via its inherent authority but rather “[p]ursuant to express 
statutory authority.” Id. at 1437.  
 63.  FOSTER, supra note 8, at 5.  
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  The Supreme Court was authorized to make civil procedural rules so long as the rules 
did not “abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.” Rules Enabling Act 
of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064. Authority to create rules of criminal procedure followed 
soon after in 1940. Act of June 29, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-675, 58 Stat. 688. The statutory 
authorization for promulgating both civil and criminal rules of procedure was consolidated in 28 
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enacted in 1944,68 codified common law grand jury secrecy into Rule 
6(e).69 The rule has been amended a number of times.70 It currently 
states: 
 
(2) Secrecy. 
(A) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any 
person except in accordance with Rule 6(e)(2)(B). 
(B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following 
persons must not disclose a matter occurring before the 
grand jury: 
(i) a grand juror; 
(ii) an interpreter; 
(iii) a court reporter; 
(iv) an operator of a recording device; 
(v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony;  
(vi) an attorney for the government; or 
(vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii).71 
 
In short, the rule provides that, unless otherwise specified, the 
group of persons listed in (2)(B) must keep grand jury materials secret. 
The list encompasses those present during grand jury proceedings 
except witnesses,72 who are free to disclose their testimony.73  
 
U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, §§ 401–407, Pub. 
L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648–52 (1988). 
 68.  Order, 327 U.S. 825 (1946) (incorporating the 1944 rules into the first Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure). 
 69.  Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., 460 U.S. 557, 566 n.11 (1983) (“The General Rule of 
Secrecy codifies a longstanding rule of common law which we have recognized as ‘an integral part 
of our criminal justice system.’” (quoting Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 
211, 218 n.9 (1979))); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 826, 837–38 (1946) (superseded 
1966). 
 70.  See 18 U.S.C. app. at 440–49 (2018) (describing amendments to Rule 6(e)). 
 71.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). For the significance of the structure of the rule as reproduced 
here, see infra Part II.A. 
 72.  Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)(1) (allowing prosecutors, the witness, interpreters, and 
a court reporter or an operator of a recording device to be present during a grand jury session), 
with FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B) (omitting the witness from the list of those bound to secrecy). 
 73.  BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, § 5:5 (noting that witnesses are free to disclose their 
testimony but may not be compelled to do so, including in separate proceedings).  
Notably, judges are not included in the list of persons subject to grand jury secrecy, for two 
reasons. First, judges are not listed among those who may be present while the grand jury is in 
session, and who are then made subject to grand jury secrecy. See United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (“No judge presides to monitor [the grand jury’s] proceedings.”); FED R. 
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Subsection (3) governs “Exceptions,” of which there are two 
categories: those that allow the attorney for the government to disclose 
materials without prior authorization and those that require approval 
from the court. First, subparagraphs (3)(A) to (D) provide exceptions 
that do not require judicial authorization. Rule 6(e)(3)(A) allows 
disclosure of grand jury materials, except for the jurors’ deliberations 
and votes, to (i) a government attorney “for use in performing that 
attorney’s duty,” (ii) any government personnel that a government 
attorney needs “to assist in performing that attorney’s duty to enforce 
federal criminal law,” or (iii) any person authorized under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3322,74 which governs disclosure to enforce certain financial and 
banking laws.75 Those who receive grand jury information under the 
latter two exceptions are also bound to secrecy.76 In addition, Rule 
6(e)(3)(C) allows government attorneys to disclose grand jury 
materials to other federal grand juries.77 Finally, Rule 6(e)(3)(D) 
permits disclosure of materials related to foreign intelligence and 
national security.78 
 
 
 
CRIM. P. 6(d)(1) (making no allowance for judges to be present). The majority in Pitch v. United 
States went so far as to say that “Rule 6 does not permit the district judge to be present in the 
grand jury room at all.” Pitch, 953 F.3d 1226, 1237 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 20-224 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2020). Judges do not “participa[te] in the grand jury proceedings, 
and thus [are] not ordinarily privy to those proceedings unless and until a party raises an issue 
having to do with the grand jury, or the district court is called upon by the grand jury to enforce 
a subpoena.” Id. (citing FED R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii)). 
Second, judges have a limited role in grand jury proceedings. “The extent of the district 
court’s ‘involvement . . . has generally been confined to the constitutive one of calling the grand 
jurors together and administering their oaths of office,’ or to enforcing grand jury subpoenas.” Id. 
(quoting United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47–48 (1992)). The court impanels the grand jury, 
instructs it, gives it the subpoena power, and discharges it when it is finished. Kuckes, The 
Democratic Prosecutor, supra note 2, at 1272. The prosecutor controls the rest, including the cases 
the grand jury considers, the evidence it sees, and the charges on which it votes. Id. The prosecutor 
is also the grand jury’s legal adviser. Id. at 1273. Because judges have a limited role in the grand 
jury’s work and are not present during the proceedings, explicitly including judges in the general 
secrecy rule is unnecessary. Plus, judges do not make the actual disclosure, they merely authorize 
it. 
 74.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i)–(iii). 
 75.  18 U.S.C. § 3322 (2018). 
 76.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B)(vii) (providing that the secrecy rule applies to those “to 
whom disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii)”). 
 77.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C). 
 78.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D). 
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Second, some exceptions require judicial authorization. Rule 
6(e)(3)(E) provides: 
 
(E) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a 
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it 
directs—of a grand-jury matter: 
(i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial 
proceeding; 
(ii) at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground 
may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter 
that occurred before the grand jury; 
(iii) at the request of the government, when sought by a 
foreign court or prosecutor for use in an official 
criminal investigation; 
(iv) at the request of the government if it shows that the 
matter may disclose a violation of State, Indian tribal, 
or foreign criminal law, as long as the disclosure is to an 
appropriate state, state-subdivision, Indian tribal, or 
foreign government official for the purpose of enforcing 
that law; or 
(v) at the request of the government if it shows that the 
matter may disclose a violation of military criminal law 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as long as 
the disclosure is to an appropriate military official for 
the purpose of enforcing that law.79 
 
The rule uses a permissive “may,” signifying that although judicial 
authorization is required, the judge may refuse.80 When the judge does 
authorize disclosure, she is free to impose time, manner, and other 
restrictions.81  
To move for disclosure under one of the exceptions requiring 
judicial authorization, parties must show “particularized need” for the 
disclosure.82 In Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops 
 
 79.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E). 
 80.  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 112 (2012) (“The traditional, commonly repeated rule is that shall is mandatory 
and may is permissive . . . .”).  
 81.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E). 
 82.  United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 480 (1983). 
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Northwest,83 the Court defined the test as requiring parties to “show 
that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in 
another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than 
the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to 
cover only material so needed.”84 Thus, although exceptions codified 
in Rule 6(e)(3)(E) define the “kind of need that must be shown,”85 the 
particularized need test defines the “degree” to which a party must 
have that need to justify disclosure.86 At its core, the test weighs the 
need for disclosure under an enumerated exception against the need 
for continued secrecy and requires that the request for disclosure be 
tailored to the need.  
In sum, Rule 6(e) provides a general secrecy rule followed by a 
detailed list of enumerated exceptions, some requiring judicial 
authorization and some that do not. When a party moves for disclosure 
under an exception requiring judicial authorization, the party must 
show a particularized need for that disclosure. The question remains 
whether Rule 6(e) allows judges to authorize disclosure not otherwise 
provided for in the rule’s text. 
II.  TEXTUAL LIMITATIONS ON DISCLOSURE 
OUTSIDE OF RULE 6(E) 
The text of Rule 6(e) suggests there is no basis for authorizing 
disclosure outside of its enumerated exceptions. Rule 6(e)(2)(A) states 
that “[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except 
in accordance with Rule 6(e)(2)(B).”87 Rule 6(e)(2)(B) gives the 
general secrecy rule and provides a list of people who “[u]nless these 
rules provide otherwise, . . . must not disclose a matter occurring 
before the grand jury.”88 Then, Rule 6(e)(3)(E) stipulates that “[t]he 
court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a manner, and subject to 
 
 83.  Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979). 
 84.  Id. at 222. 
 85.  Baggot, 463 U.S. at 480. 
 86.  Id.; see also United States v. McDougal, 559 F.3d 837, 840–41 (8th Cir. 2009) (“A request 
for disclosure that falls under one of these specified exceptions must also contain a ‘showing of 
particularized need for grand jury materials’ before disclosure becomes appropriate.” (quoting 
United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983))); United States v. Procter & Gamble 
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (explaining the moving party must show “a compelling 
necessity . . . with particularity”). For more on this test, see Lytton, supra note 32, at 1115–17 
(explaining the mechanics of the test and the difficulties in passing it).  
 87.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(A). 
 88.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B). 
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any other conditions that it directs—of a grand-jury matter” and lists 
five situations in which the court may allow the disclosure.89 Two 
provisions bear on whether the text permits disclosure outside the 
bounds of the rule: the “unless these rules provide otherwise” language 
that limits the general secrecy rule and the exception providing for 
judicially authorized disclosure. 
A. Textual Limits on the General Secrecy Rule 
Grand jury secrecy is not absolute. Rather, secrecy is required 
“[u]nless these rules provide otherwise,”90 which they do in a list of 
exceptions following the secrecy rule. Judges grappling with the rule’s 
text have disagreed over the reach and strength of the phrase “unless 
these rules provide otherwise.” Some have reasoned that the phrase 
limits disclosure of grand jury material to only those situations allowed 
by the enumerated exceptions in Rule 6(e)(3).91 Others have said the 
phrase limits only the types of people who must keep grand jury 
materials secret, while the list of exceptions requiring judicial 
authorization gives courts guidance without being exclusive.92 The 
former reading better adheres to the text and structure of the rule. This 
Section first looks at the plain text meaning of the secrecy rule before 
showing that the history of the rule supports that plain text reading. 
1. Plain Text Meaning of Rule 6(e).  The word “unless” introduces 
the rule’s limiting language. Typically, words should be given “their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,”93 except when “the 
context indicates that they bear a technical sense.”94 There is no 
indication that “unless” has a technical meaning here. It functions as a 
conjunction.95 In this usage, “unless” means “except under the 
 
 89.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E). 
 90.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B). 
 91.  See Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (stating that 
Rule 6(e) “is not merely permissive” but “instructs that deviations . . . are not permitted ‘[u]nless 
these rules provide otherwise’” (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B))), petition for cert. filed, No. 
20-224 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2020); McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842, 845–46 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
(“[D]eviations from the detailed list of exceptions in Rule 6(e) are not permitted . . . .”), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 597 (2020). 
 92.  See Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 764 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding this reading “far 
more reasonable”). 
 93.  Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). 
 94.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 80, at 69–77 (explaining the ordinary-meaning canon).  
 95.  See Unless, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/215075 
[https://perma.cc/5UGB-HKMZ] (illustrating uses of “unless” as a conjunction). 
MCKNIGHT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020  12:53 PM 
466  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:451 
circumstances that.”96 Using this definition, the general secrecy rule 
might be rewritten as “except under the circumstances that these rules 
provide, the following persons must not disclose a matter occurring 
before the grand jury.” Thus, rather than limiting the group of people 
who are bound to secrecy, this language refers to situations in which 
disclosure would be appropriate. 
Rule 6(e)(2)(A), which comes just before the secrecy rule and its 
limiting language, supports this reading. It says no person may be 
obligated to secrecy except those listed in Rule 6(e)(2)(B).97 
Effectively, the rule binds everyone, besides witnesses, who is in the 
room during the grand jury proceedings and thus would have 
information to disclose.98 If the limiting language means essentially the 
same thing—that it only restricts the group of people who are bound 
to secrecy—then either it or Rule 6(e)(2)(A) must be superfluous. Yet, 
statutes generally should be interpreted so that “‘no clause’ is rendered 
‘superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”99 If Rule 6(e)(2)(A) and the 
limiting language both restrict who has an obligation to keep grand jury 
materials secret, then one of them is unnecessary. 
Taking the ordinary meaning of “unless” together with the need 
to avoid surplusage, the limiting language refers to the circumstances 
when those bound to secrecy may break their silence by pointing the 
reader forward to the exceptions in Rule 6(e)(3). This forward outlook 
fits the structure of Rule 6(e)(2). After all, Rule 6(e)(2)(A) explicitly 
points the reader forward to 6(e)(2)(B). Within that provision, 
6(e)(2)(B)(vii) explicitly points the reader forward to two of the 
exceptions in 6(e)(3).100 Further, the limiting language modifies the 
entire phrase following it, which states that “the following persons must 
not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury.”101 As the general 
 
 96.  RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2080 (2d ed. 2001); see also 
OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, supra note 95 (defining “unless” to mean “except” or “except if” 
when it is “followed by an adverb, phrase, or participial clause without verb, expressing the 
manner, place, time, or other circumstance in which an exception to a preceding (or following) 
statement applies”). 
 97.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(A). 
 98.  See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text (explaining that witnesses and judges are 
not listed among those bound by secrecy). 
 99.  Young v. UPS, Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 226 (2015) (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 
19, 31 (2001)); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 80, at 174–79 (explaining the surplusage 
canon). 
 100.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B)(vii) (requiring that “a person to whom disclosure is made 
under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii)” is bound to secrecy). 
 101.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B). 
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prohibition against disclosure, this is the secrecy rule’s core.102 The 
prohibition itself must be followed unless the rules provide exceptions.  
One problem with this reading is that it emphasizes a phrase that 
limits the general secrecy rule, but which is located in a subpart within 
the rule. As one court explained, the government in that case failed to 
show “why a limitation buried in subsection (B) of subpart (2) of Rule 
6(e) secretly applies to the rule as whole, or even worse . . . to an 
entirely different subpart.”103 Certainly, the general presumption is that 
language within a subpart relates only to that subpart and language 
indented underneath it.104 The presumption raises a question of why 
the limiting language in subsection (2)(B) should apply to a different 
subpart of the rule—Rule 6(e)(3)—rather than apply only to the 
subsection where it is located.  
The answer lies in the rule’s design. The rule’s drafters placed the 
general secrecy requirement that is the focus of subpart (2) in a 
subsection within that part. The text of subpart (2) is merely the title, 
“Secrecy,”105 of the subsections underneath it, just as subpart (3), 
“Exceptions,”106 is merely the title of the subsections following it. 
Instead of placing the general rule directly after the title, as the drafters 
did in subpart (1),107 the drafters placed the secrecy rule in a subsection 
under its title, as it did for all of the exceptions.108 Thus, language 
limiting the secrecy requirement naturally appears in the subsection 
alongside the primary secrecy rule. By recognizing that subparts 
6(e)(2) and 6(e)(3) are each structured as a short title followed by 
enumerated subsections, the language limiting the general secrecy rule 
is not “buried” in a subsection but is placed next to the core rule, which 
itself is no more buried than any of its exceptions. 
 
 102.  McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842, 844–45 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Rule 6(e)(2)(B) sets out the 
general rule . . . . Rule 6(e)(3) then sets forth a detailed list of ‘exceptions’ . . . .”), cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 597 (2020); see also Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) 
(describing the structure of the Rule), petition for cert. filed, No. 20-224 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2020).  
 103.  Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 764 (7th Cir. 2016); see Pitch, 953 F.3d at 1255 
(Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing the same). For the text of the rule, see supra notes 71, 79 and 
accompanying text. 
 104.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 80, at 156 (describing the scope-of-subparts canon). 
 105.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (emphasis omitted). 
 106.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3) (emphasis omitted). 
 107.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1) (“Recording the Proceedings. Except while the grand jury 
is deliberating or voting, all proceedings must be recorded by a court reporter or by a suitable 
recording device.”). 
 108.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)–(G) (being placed under the title “Exceptions”).  
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2. Drafting History of Rule 6(e).  The history of Rule 6(e) supports 
the plain text reading. Similar to the current iteration, the 1976 rule 
allowed disclosure to government attorneys without judicial 
authorization.109 The rule then imposed a secrecy requirement on those 
in the courtroom, except for witnesses, during grand jury sessions, 
saying that disclosure could occur “only when so directed by the court” 
under two circumstances.110 The first was preliminarily to or in 
connection with a judicial proceeding, and the second was at the 
request of a defendant who could show there might be a reason to 
challenge an indictment’s validity based on the grand jury’s 
proceedings.111 
That same year, the Advisory Committee tried to amend the rule 
to define “attorneys for the government” according to Rule 54(c) and 
to allow disclosure without judicial authorization to other government 
personnel necessary to helping government attorneys with their 
work.112 When the amendment was sent to Congress, the House 
Judiciary Committee became concerned because critics of the 
amendment argued “it would permit too broad an exception to the rule 
of keeping grand jury proceedings secret.”113 The concern was that 
“lack of precision” regarding the scope of the amendment would lead 
to prosecutorial “misuse of the grand jury.”114 Indeed, both the House 
and Senate committees agreed that because the rule did “not clearly 
 
 109.  Labeled “Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure,” the Rule provided, in part, 
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury . . . may be made to the attorneys 
for the government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, a juror, 
attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any 
typist . . . may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed 
by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when 
permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds 
may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before 
the grand jury. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 383 U.S. 1195, 1196 (1966), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at 1410 (1976) 
(superseded 1977). 
 110.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 383 U.S. at 1196. 
 111.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 383 U.S. at 1196. 
 112.  SUBCOMM. ON CRIM. JUST., H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 
AMENDMENTS: FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TRANSMITTED TO CONGRESS ON 
APRIL 26, 1976, at 1 (Comm. Print 1977). 
 113.  See H.R. REP. NO. 95-195, at 4 & n.8 (1977) (noting critics’ concerns). Indeed, the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice surveyed U.S. attorneys’ offices and found that “there [was] 
no consistent practice concerning what things can be disclosed, to whom they can be disclosed, 
and under what circumstances they can be disclosed.” Id. at 4. 
 114.  See S. REP. NO. 95-354, at 6–8 (1977) (“[C]riticism . . . seemed to stem more from the 
lack of precision in defining . . . the intended scope of the proposed change than from a 
fundamental disagreement with the objective.”). 
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spell out when, under what circumstances, and to whom grand jury 
information can be disclosed,” it needed “to be rewritten entirely.”115 
The 1977 rule was the product of Congress’s redrafting. For the 
first time, the rule was split into two subparts, one for the general rule 
and one for the exceptions.116 Although the exceptions were no longer 
in the same subpart as the general rule, Congress added language to 
the general secrecy rule limiting disclosure, saying that persons 
identified by the rule “shall not disclose matters occurring before the 
grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules.”117 In the 
exceptions requiring judicial authorization, Congress reiterated the 
secrecy rule, saying “[d]isclosure otherwise prohibited by this 
rule . . . may also be made[] (i) when so directed by a court preliminary 
to or in connection with a judicial proceeding; or (ii) when permitted 
by a court at the request of the defendant” to challenge the defendant’s 
indictment.118 Thus, Congress set out the secrecy rule and cabined 
exceptions to those listed in the rules. Congress emphasized this by 
adding language in each set of exceptions that referred back to the 
general secrecy rule, just as the limiting language in the rule pointed 
readers forward to the exceptions. 
This general structure remained the same until 2002, when the 
Advisory Committee restyled the language and structure of rule.119 The 
changes were “intended to be stylistic,” except as provided in the 
Advisory Committee’s notes.120 The stylistic changes rewrote the 
limiting language to what it is presently: “[u]nless these rules provide 
otherwise.”121 The restyling also dropped the repetitive phrase 
“[d]isclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule” in the rule’s 
 
 115.  Compare H.R. REP. NO. 95-195, at 5 (“Rule 6(e) is unclear. . . . It ought to be rewritten 
entirely.”), with S. REP. NO. 95-354, at 7 (“In this state of uncertainty, the Committee believes it 
is timely to redraft subdivision (e) of Rule 6 to make it clear.”).  
 116.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1), Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, 91 Stat. 319, reprinted 
in 18 U.S.C. app. at 1386 (Supp. II 1979) (superseded 1979). 
 117.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1), 91 Stat. 319 (emphasis added). 
 118.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(C), 91 Stat. 319–20. Congress used identical language related 
to prohibited disclosure in the section listing exceptions not requiring judicial authorization. FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(A), 91 Stat. 319. 
 119.  One smaller structural change occurred in 1979 when Rule 6(e)(1) was added to require 
the proceedings to be recorded and the general secrecy rule became Rule 6(e)(2). See FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee’s note to the 1979 amendment (discussing the content and 
benefits of the then-proposed Rule 6(e)(1)). 
 120.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment. 
 121.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B), 535 U.S. 1175, 1185 (2002), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at 
1387 (Supp. II 2004) (superseded 2006). 
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exceptions.122 Yet these two changes were not meant to change the 
meaning of the rule—namely, that Rule 6(e) provides the exclusive 
grand jury secrecy rule and exceptions to it. 
B. The Exceptions Requiring Judicial Authorization 
Although the limiting language in Rule 6(e) cabins exceptions to 
grand jury secrecy to those enumerated, the exceptions requiring 
judicial authorization might still allow judges to disclose material 
outside of the rule. Under Rule 6(e)(3)(E), “[t]he court may authorize 
disclosure—at a time, in a manner, and subject to any other conditions 
that it directs—of a grand-jury matter.”123 It then lists five 
circumstances in which the court may allow the disclosure. Because the 
circumstances are specific and wide-ranging, the rule should be read as 
providing an exhaustive list of exceptions. 
Generally, “[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of 
others.”124 However, this is the case only when what is specified “can 
reasonably be thought to be an expression of all that shares in the grant 
or prohibition involved.”125 This determination largely depends on 
context.126 However, “[t]he more specific the enumeration, the greater 
the force of the canon.”127 The exceptions requiring judicial disclosure 
go beyond simply giving judges discretion to authorize the disclosure. 
Rather, they list the circumstances in which a judge may do so. Those 
circumstances are specific, allowing judges to authorize disclosure “(i) 
preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;” “(ii) at 
the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may exist to 
dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred before the 
grand jury;” at the request of the government for (iii) aiding a criminal 
investigation “by a foreign court or prosecutor,” (iv) to enforcing the 
criminal law of other specified jurisdictions, or (iv) if the materials may 
show a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.128 These 
circumstances both cover a wide range of possibilities and are specific, 
often listing who may request the disclosure, what a party must show 
to obtain disclosure, and for what purpose a disclosure may be used. 
 
 122.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)–(C), 535 U.S. at 1186 (superseded 2004). 
 123.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E). 
 124.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 80, at 107 (explaining the negative-implication canon). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 108. 
 128.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i)–(v). 
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Within these circumstances, judges have discretion whether to 
authorize the disclosure and whether to impose time, manner, or other 
conditions on it.129  
Finally, the Supreme Court has spoken directly to the type of rule 
structure at issue here, saying that “[w]here Congress explicitly 
enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition,” as is the case 
with Rule 6(e), then “additional exceptions are not to be implied, in 
the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.”130 Thus, by 
negative implication, the rule does not contemplate judges authorizing 
disclosure outside of the enumerated circumstances. 
Nevertheless, some courts have held that the enumerated 
circumstances are merely a nonexclusive list of examples setting out 
“frequently invoked reasons to disclose grand-jury materials, so that 
the court knows that no special hesitation is necessary in those 
circumstances.”131As mere examples, then, the authority to authorize 
disclosure presumably comes not from the rule, but from courts’ 
inherent authority, which Part III discusses in detail. After all, any 
inherent authority the court might have to create new exceptions 
predated the adoption of Rule 6(e). And, as Part III explains,132 for a 
rule to limit courts’ inherent authority, it must do so by “a much clearer 
expression” than a negative implication.133 The tension, then, between 
the strong negative implication in Rule 6(e) and courts’ longstanding 
exercise of inherent authority renders the law unsettled. Congress has 
enumerated specific exceptions outside of which courts arguably 
should not venture. Yet courts have long created new exceptions to 
grand jury secrecy under their inherent authority, and something more 
than a negative implication is necessary to limit that authority. 
Two considerations arguably tip the scale toward foreclosing 
judge-made exceptions to the rule. First, the rule relies on more than 
just a negative implication. The general secrecy rule contains limiting 
 
 129.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E). 
 130.  Cf. Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980). 
 131.  Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 764–65 (7th Cir. 2016); see also In re Craig, 131 
F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[B]y delimiting the exceptions . . . Rule 6(e)(3) governs almost all 
requests[, but] . . . there are certain ‘special circumstances’ in which release of grand jury records 
is appropriate even outside of the boundaries of the rule.” (quoting In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489, 494 
(2d Cir. 1973) (supplemental opinion))); In re Hastings, 735 F.2d 1261, 1269 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(“[W]e do not believe that the district court’s power . . . must stand or fall upon a literal 
construction of the language of Rule 6(e).”), overruled by Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226 
(11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, No. 20-224 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2020). 
 132.  See infra Part III.A.  
 133.  Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–32 (1962). 
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language, described in detail above, that limits exceptions to grand jury 
secrecy to those circumstances enumerated in the rule, including those 
requiring judicial authorization. Second, Congress’s role in the 
evolution of Rule 6(e) shows concern for specifying exactly when, and 
to whom, disclosures may be made.134 As a result, Rule 6(e) is the 
exclusive grand jury secrecy rule and the exhaustive list of exceptions 
to it. 
III.  COURTS’ INHERENT AUTHORITY TO REGULATE 
GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS 
Beyond the text of Rule 6(e), federal courts have relied on 
inherent supervisory authority to promulgate rules of grand jury 
procedure.135 This authority is one “governed not by rule or statute but 
by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own 
affairs.”136 It is power that courts have simply by being courts. 
However, there is no consensus regarding the source or scope of this 
power.137 In the context of grand jury secrecy, courts have asserted 
inherent authority to authorize disclosures outside of Rule 6(e) at least 
since the 1970s. But even then, not all judges agreed about doing so. 
For example, when the Second Circuit ruled on In re Biaggi138 in 1973, 
Chief Judge Henry Friendly held the court could “rest[] on the exercise 
of a sound discretion under the special circumstances” of a case to 
order disclosure.139 In dissent, Judge Paul Hays pointed out that Rule 
 
 134.  See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Congress was particularly concerned about 
prosecutorial abuse. See S. REP. NO. 95-354, at 8 (1977) (noting the redrafted rule tried to “allay 
the concerns of those who fear that [prosecutorial power to disclose grand jury materials] will 
lead to misuse of the grand jury to enforce non-criminal Federal laws”). But as detailed above, 
Congress paid close attention to judge-ordered disclosures as well in redrafting the rule. See supra 
note 118 and accompanying text. 
 135.  BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, § 9:29. 
 136.  Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016) (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 630–31). 
 137.  See id. (“[T]his Court has never precisely delineated the outer boundaries of a district 
court’s inherent powers . . . .”); Beale, supra note 55, at 1455–62 (describing the use of supervisory 
power by lower federal courts—generally, not just specifically for the grand jury—and saying the 
“source” of that authority “has not been identified”). Professor Sara Sun Beale outlines the 
possible sources of authority for general supervisory power, which include the federal common 
law, the Supreme Court’s own authority, and the authority derived from being a part of the 
judiciary. Id. at 1464. Beale argues, however, that these are not sufficient, especially given how 
lower courts use supervisory power. Id. at 1464–68. Inherent authority at least derives from the 
judicial power granted by Article III as an implied ancillary judicial power, but the Supreme Court 
“has had little occasion to focus on the scope of that implied authority.” Id.  
 138.  In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 139.  Id. at 494 (supplemental opinion). 
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6(e) “forbids disclosure of grand jury proceedings with certain carefully 
limited exceptions.”140 He chided the majority for creating an exception 
“without the support of any” statute or precedent.141 In Hays’s view, 
the court should have relied on “rules of law” rather than a judge’s view 
of “what ‘the public interest’ may require.”142 The Second Circuit 
affirmed Biaggi decades later, crafting a test for “‘special 
circumstances’ in which” judges may release grand jury records outside 
of Rule 6(e).143  
This Part considers courts’ inherent authority regarding grand jury 
secrecy rules. It briefly surveys the source, scope, and limits of courts’ 
inherent authority over their own proceedings before arguing that 
Supreme Court precedent likely places additional limitations on this 
power in the grand jury context. Finally, it considers and rejects a 
counterargument that Rule 6(e)’s common law history, in conjunction 
with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b), justifies exceptions 
made via courts’ inherent authority. Ultimately, this Part concludes 
that courts’ inherent authority over grand jury procedure is sufficiently 
limited so as to cast doubt on the propriety of judge-made exceptions 
outside the boundaries of Rule 6(e). 
A. Overview of the Source, Scope, and Limitations of Courts’ 
Inherent Authority 
Courts’ inherent authority stems from the Vesting Clause in 
Article III of the Constitution.144 Although its scope is unclear, it 
generally encompasses powers “which cannot be dispensed with in a 
Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.”145 
Because the Article III power is vested in each individual court, the 
power is inherently a local power necessary for administering a court’s 
 
 140.  Id. at 493 (Hays, J., dissenting). 
 141.  Id. at 494. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 144.  Beale, supra note 55, at 1468 (arguing, based on Supreme Court precedent, “authority 
to regulate judicial procedure is an incidental or ancillary power implied in the article III” Vesting 
Clause); see supra note 137. The Article III Vesting Clause provides, “The judicial power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 145.  Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). 
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own proceedings.146 Thus, the substance of a procedural rule adopted 
using “inherent procedural authority lies fundamentally within the 
discretion of the adopting court” and applies to that specific court’s 
proceedings, though they are reviewable on appeal.147  
The degree of necessity justifying the use of inherent authority is 
unclear. Some suggest that the use of inherent authority is bound by 
strict necessity.148 Others take a broader approach, noting that the 
Supreme Court has delineated an inviolable core of inherent judicial 
authority rather than defined its outer bounds.149 However, those 
taking a broader view still acknowledge that courts’ inherent authority 
is limited, recognizing that in most cases courts should defer to contrary 
rules made by Congress.150 This Note assumes the latter, broader 
view.151 
The authority to craft procedural rules is not exclusive to the 
judicial branch. Congress has broad authority to regulate judicial 
procedure via the Necessary and Proper Clause.152 For example, 
Congress passed legislation authorizing the Supreme Court to 
promulgate the federal rules of civil and criminal procedure.153 This 
statutory authority has become the primary mechanism to create and 
ensure uniformity in federal judicial procedure.154 Because the rules 
stem from a congressional authorization, they carry significant weight, 
such that lower courts “have no more discretion to disregard [a] Rule’s 
mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory 
provisions.”155 It follows that courts may only use their inherent 
 
 146.  Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 817 (2008) (arguing 
that “any procedural authority conferred by Article III is entirely local” because it only 
“empowers a court to regulate its own proceedings”). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 59, at 847 (arguing inherent authority can be used only if 
courts cannot otherwise adequately “perform their express constitutional functions”). 
 149.  See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 146, at 880–81 (arguing that requiring strict necessity 
“overread[s]” the cases). 
 150.  See id. at 816 (stating Congress has authority to regulate procedure, but likely cannot 
regulate over and against “some small core of inherent [judicial] procedural authority”). 
 151.  The broader view reflects how courts actually operate. See Pushaw, supra note 59, at 849 
(saying the use of inherent authority outside of strict necessity has become “entrenched”). 
 152.  Beale, supra note 55, at 1472. 
 153.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2018) (“The 
Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and 
rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before 
magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”). 
 154.  Barrett, supra note 146, at 887. 
 155.  Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988). 
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authority to create procedural rules for matters on which neither the 
Constitution nor Congress has already spoken.156 However, the Court 
held in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.157 that when a rule’s purpose is to 
“abrogate” what was previously an area regulated under courts’ 
inherent authority, it must do so by “a much clearer expression” than 
a negative implication.158  
In 2016, the Court summarized several previous cases and 
affirmed this general framework in Dietz v. Bouldin.159 There, the 
Court held that district courts have inherent power outside of 
enumerated procedural rules to manage their “own affairs.”160 
However, two limitations constrain the use of inherent authority: (1) 
exercises of inherent supervisory authority “must be ‘a reasonable 
response to the problems and needs’ confronting the court’s fair 
administration of justice,” and (2) they “cannot be contrary to any 
express grant of or limitation on the district court’s power contained in 
a rule or statute.”161 The latter requirement prohibits both directly 
contradicting a rule and indirectly circumventing it.162 And Dietz did 
not alter the earlier requirement that a rule must contain more than a 
negative implication to abrogate courts’ inherent authority.163 
B. Limitations on Inherent Authority over Grand Jury Procedure 
Specifically 
The Dietz Court did not expressly say whether courts’ inherent 
authority over their own proceedings extends to grand jury procedure. 
Because the grand jury is an “arm of the court,”164 courts’ inherent 
 
 156.  Id. at 254. 
 157.  Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). 
 158.  Id. at 630–32 (holding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) could not abrogate inherent 
authority merely on the basis of a negative implication); cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 
32, 46–49 (1991) (stating that inherent power can be limited by a rule but a court will “not lightly 
assume that Congress has intended” to so limit that power). 
 159.  Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891–92 (2016). 
 160.  Id. at 1891 (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 630) (affirming that district courts may use 
inherent authority “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases” (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 630–31)). 
 161.  Id. at 1892 (quoting Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823–24 (1996)). 
 162.  Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) (stating inherent authority cannot be 
used “to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure”). 
 163.  See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 164.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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authority, bound by Dietz, likely does extend to the grand jury.165 
However, because the grand jury is independent, belonging neither to 
the executive nor the judiciary,166 grand jury proceedings are not wholly 
a court’s own proceedings. As a result, they are different than the 
inherent authority to regulate local procedure contemplates.167 Due to 
this structure, limitations in addition to those in Dietz narrow the 
extent to which courts may use inherent authority to create grand jury 
procedural rules.168  
In the grand jury context, the Supreme Court has invoked the 
principle that courts cannot use inherent authority contrary to an 
express rule. And the Court later went beyond this rule to restrict 
inherent authority in grand jury proceedings even when there was no 
express rule restricting the court’s action. First, in Bank of Nova Scotia 
v. United States,169 the district court used its inherent authority to 
dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct during the grand 
jury proceedings even though the misconduct was not prejudicial to the 
defendant.170 The dismissal circumvented Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 52(a), which provides that courts should ignore harmless 
errors.171 The Supreme Court held that district courts cannot use 
inherent authority to avoid Rule 52(a) and thereby dismiss an 
indictment for nonprejudicial prosecutorial misconduct during grand 
 
 165.  One other indication that it applies is that Dietz cites Bank of Nova Scotia v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), discussed infra, as an example of the proposition that “inherent power 
cannot be contrary to any express grant of or limitation on the district court’s power contained in 
a rule or statute.” Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1892. Because Bank of Nova Scotia involved the grand jury, 
there is some evidence the Dietz Court intended its two-part framework for inherent power to 
apply to grand jury procedure. 
 166.  See supra Part I.A. 
 167.  See Beale, supra note 55, at 1492–93 (“[G]rand jury proceedings are not simply an 
extension of the judicial proceedings regulated by the federal courts’ ancillary authority.”). 
 168.  BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, § 9:31 (“In practical terms, the most significant limitations 
flow from the Congressionally authorized adoption of a comprehensive general framework of 
procedural rules, including the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). In light of Congress’s 
broad power to regulate judicial procedure—and concerns about whether a supervisory power 
over judicial procedure even extends to grand jury procedure—“it is doubtful whether this 
authority is broad enough to legitimate all of the supervisory power rulings establishing 
procedural rules for grand jury proceedings.” Id.; see infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 169.  Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988). 
 170.  Id. at 253. 
 171.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect 
substantial rights must be disregarded.”). 
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jury proceedings.172 In short, lower courts cannot avoid explicit rules by 
invoking inherent authority. 
Second, in United States v. Williams,173 the Court relied on Bank 
of Nova Scotia to again limit courts’ inherent authority over grand jury 
proceedings.174 Here, the district court granted the defendant’s motion 
to receive all exculpatory grand jury transcripts.175 After the disclosure, 
the defendant moved for, and the district court granted, dismissal of 
the indictment based upon the prosecution’s failure to show the grand 
jury evidence negating an element of the crime charged.176 The circuit 
court affirmed, relying on an earlier circuit decision in which the court 
had used inherent authority to impose a duty on prosecutors to disclose 
exculpatory information to the grand jury.177 The Supreme Court 
reversed.178 
Summarizing the holding in Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court stated 
that district courts may not use their inherent authority “as a means of 
prescribing . . . standards of prosecutorial conduct in the first instance” 
as they could for regulating “prosecutorial conduct before the courts 
themselves.”179 Thus, the circuit court erred by establishing “standards 
of prosecutorial conduct” for grand jury proceedings.180 Given that 
judges do not preside over grand jury proceedings, generally “no such 
‘supervisory’ judicial authority exists.”181 Further, because the grand 
jury is an independent body, the Court hesitated to allow inherent 
authority to be “a basis for prescribing modes of grand jury 
procedure.”182 Thus, whatever authority courts may have to create such 
 
 172.  See Bank of N.S., 487 U.S. at 254 (disallowing the use of inherent authority “to 
circumvent the harmless-error inquiry prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a)”). 
 173.  United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992). 
 174.  See id. at 46–47 (describing the holding of Bank of Nova Scotia). See generally Schiappa, 
supra note 32 (exploring the Williams decision and its aftereffects). 
 175.  Williams, 504 U.S. at 39. 
 176.  See id. (describing how the trial court dismissed the indictment because the exculpatory 
evidence created a reasonable doubt about defendant’s guilt). 
 177.  Id. at 43 & n.4; see also Schiappa, supra note 32, at 315–16 (stating that before the Court’s 
holding, a majority of circuits held there was no duty to disclose exculpatory information because 
“an accused’s guilt or innocence” should be determined at trial). 
 178.  Williams, 504 U.S. at 55. 
 179.  Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted). 
 180.  See id. (“It is this latter exercise [of prescribing conduct] that respondent demands.”). 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  Id. at 49–50. 
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rules “is a very limited one, not remotely comparable to the power they 
maintain over their own proceedings.”183 
The Court’s decision in Williams differs from Bank of Nova Scotia 
in at least one key respect. In Bank of Nova Scotia, the lower court 
used inherent authority to avoid applying an express rule. But, in 
Williams, the circuit court’s imposition of a duty on prosecutors did not 
contradict or circumvent an existing rule or statute. Nevertheless, the 
Court held that the circuit court’s use of its inherent authority was 
improper. This suggests a stronger constraint on the use of inherent 
authority in relation to the grand jury than the limits summarized in 
Dietz, which prohibited the use of inherent authority “contrary to any 
express grant of, or limitation on,” courts’ inherent authority and even 
then only to solve a problem of the administration of justice.184 
Williams shows that in the grand jury context, courts also cannot act 
contrary to some implicit grants of or limitations on inherent 
authority.185 
The circuit court’s decision to impose a duty on prosecutors may 
not have violated an explicit procedural rule, but it was contrary to 
implicit rules governing the “relationships between the prosecutor, the 
constituting court, and the grand jury itself.”186 Grand juries do not 
determine the merits of the accused’s guilt or innocence but make an 
independent assessment as to whether a charge is appropriate.187 
Imposing a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence alters the role of the 
grand jury to be an adjudicator of guilt and innocence.188 This would be 
a fundamental change in what grand juries are impaneled to 
accomplish.189  
 
 183.  Id. at 50 (emphasis added). 
 184.  See Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1888, 1891–92 (2016) (emphasis added) (explaining 
how “the Court has recognized certain limits” on courts’ inherent authority). Although Dietz was 
decided more than a decade after Williams, the limitations on inherent authority that it 
announced were not new. Rather, they merely summarized prior case law, which allows for the 
comparison made here. 
 185.  By “implicit,” this Note refers to something uncodified, though it might be “express” in 
the sense that court precedent reflects its existence. 
 186.  See Williams, 504 U.S. at 50 (stating “that any power” a court might have to create grand 
jury procedural rules “would not permit judicial reshaping of the grand jury institution, 
substantially altering the traditional relationships between the prosecutor, the constituting court, 
and the grand jury itself”).  
 187.  Id. at 51. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  See id. at 53 (“We reject the attempt to convert a nonexistent duty of the grand jury itself 
into an obligation of the prosecutor.”). 
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On one reading, contrary to the one presented in Part II,190 using 
inherent authority to create new exceptions to Rule 6(e) does not 
directly contradict an explicit provision in the rule. However, secrecy 
is a core rule of grand jury procedure, and so there is an implicit limit 
on judges creating new exceptions, at least when the exception would 
undermine core grand jury functioning.191 The key roles of the grand 
jury as sword and shield depend upon the secrecy of its proceedings.192 
If a grand jury’s proceedings were public or its records could be easily 
disclosed, witnesses might not be fully candid for fear of retribution, 
and targets of the investigation might be more likely to flee or influence 
the grand jurors’ votes.193 Concerns such as these are not surface level 
but rather implicate core grand jury functions. Secrecy is an important 
procedural rule that protects the twin roles of the grand jury. If a judge-
made exception to Rule 6(e) would erode the secrecy rule in a way that 
undermines these core functions, courts may lack inherent authority to 
create it. 
In sum, courts’ inherent authority over grand jury procedure is 
subject to three limitations. First, any exercise of it must be a 
reasonable solution to a problem of the administration of justice. 
Second, it cannot be contrary to or an attempt to circumvent an express 
federal rule. And finally, a judge-made procedural rule may not 
contravene implicit limits on interfering with or changing core 
functions of the grand jury.  
The first limitation cuts against judge-made exceptions to grand 
jury secrecy in many cases because requests for disclosure outside the 
bounds of Rule 6(e) are not problems of judicial administration as 
much as reflections of needs by parties outside the grand jury to access 
those materials. Problems of judicial administration, such as needing 
grand jury materials for other judicial or grand jury proceedings, 
already have enumerated exceptions, making the use of inherent 
 
 190.  See supra Part II (arguing for a different reading based on the text, structure, and history 
of the rule). 
 191.  Cf. BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, § 9:31 (saying, with respect to “general procedures [that] 
do not involve the interpretation or application of any procedural rule, statute, or constitutional 
provision,” that “it is doubtful whether there is authority for supervisory power rulings of this 
nature that . . . impair the effectiveness, independence, or traditional functions of the grand 
jury”).  
 192.  See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979) (“We 
consistently have recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon 
the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”). 
 193.  Id. at 219. 
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authority unnecessary.194 Judge-made exceptions may implicate the 
second limitation insofar as they circumvent the limiting language in 
the rule.195 And as discussed in this Section, judge-made exceptions 
may very well run afoul of the third limitation. 
C. Rule 6(e)’s Common Law History 
Some courts using inherent authority to create exceptions to grand 
jury secrecy have justified doing so, in part, based on Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 57(b). Entitled “Procedure When There Is No 
Controlling Law,” the rule states that “[a] judge may regulate practice 
in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and the local 
rules of the district.”196 Relatedly, grand jury secrecy is a common law 
doctrine that was later codified into Rule 6(e).197 When the rule was 
first promulgated in 1944, the Advisory Committee recognized the 
common law history of the rule, explaining that the “rule continues the 
traditional practice of secrecy . . . except when the court permits a 
disclosure.”198 Before the rule was codified, courts relied on inherent 
authority to disclose grand jury materials when they deemed it 
appropriate.199 
Courts have used this common law history in conjunction with 
Rule 57(b) to authorize disclosure outside of Rule 6(e). For example, 
in Carlson v. United States,200 the Seventh Circuit noted it could not 
contradict an express rule under Dietz.201 And because, in the court’s 
view, Rule 6(e) does not expressly forbid creating new exceptions to 
grand jury secrecy, the court reasoned that, under Rule 57(b), it could 
use its inherent authority to authorize disclosure.202 In addition, the 
 
 194.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C), (E)(i). 
 195.  See supra Part II.A (discussing the rule’s limiting language). 
 196.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b). 
 197.  See supra Part I.B. 
 198.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee’s note to 1944 rule. 
 199.  This was often framed in terms of judges’ discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Oley, 21 
F. Supp. 281, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) (“The court has power in its sound discretion to grant a motion 
for the inspection of grand jury minutes. This discretion should be rarely exercised.”); In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1933) (stating that grand jury secrecy is 
“relaxed . . . whenever the interest of justice requires,” a “determination . . . rest[ing] largely 
within the discretion of the court”). 
 200.  Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 201.  Id. at 762. 
 202.  See id. at 763 (explaining that Rule 57(b) allows a court to authorize disclosure absent a 
“clear[] expression” of intent to abrogate a court’s inherent authority (quoting Link v. Wabash 
R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 631 (1962))).  
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court quoted the 1944 Advisory Committee Notes, reading the phrase 
“except when the court permits a disclosure” as permission to craft 
exceptions to the rule.203 Finally, the court noted that many of Rule 
6(e)’s amendments codified exceptions created by courts using 
inherent authority.204  
One way to read Rule 6(e) in light of its common law history is to 
compare it to common law statutes, which are often defined by two 
features.205 First, they are built on the common law tradition, and 
second, they are written in “sweeping, general terms,”206 leaving room 
for courts to define their content.207 Although Rule 6(e) is not a statute 
per se, it is a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court and approved by 
Congress that carries the force of a statute.208 And because rules carry 
similar force to statutes, rules that carry the same characteristics as 
common law statutes should be treated similarly.  
 
 203.  See id. at 765 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee’s note to 1944 rule). 
Although the 1944 Advisory Committee Notes use the “except when the court permits a 
disclosure” language, the 1944 rules already had exceptions requiring judicial authorizations. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 826, 837–38 (1946) (superseded 1966). This could just as easily 
refer to those exceptions as to inherent authority to create disclosures.  
 204.  See Carlson, 837 F.3d at 765 (explaining that the Committee has updated the rule “in 
response to court practices”); In re Kutler, 800 F. Supp. 2d. 42, 44–45 (D.D.C. 2011) (explaining 
that the “exceptions . . . have ‘developed historically alongside the secrecy tradition’” such “that 
courts’ authority regarding grand jury records reaches beyond Rule 6(e)’s literal wording” 
(quoting In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1997))). But see McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842, 
850 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[T]he district court has no authority outside Rule 6(e) to disclose grand 
jury matter.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 597 (2020). 
 205.  Treating a rule of criminal procedure as a common law statute is not unheard of. See 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1378 & n.84 (1988) 
(suggesting that Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), was interpreting a common law 
statute). In Harris, the Court overturned an earlier precedent through an interpretation of 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a). Harris, 382 U.S. at 162–63, 167. 
 206.  Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 641 n.12 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). But see Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are 
“Common Law Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 89, 
90 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (arguing that neither trait particularly delineates common 
law statutes as a specific category). 
 207.  See Lemos, supra note 206, at 95 (explaining that Congress writes common law statutes 
in broad terms so that “federal courts [will] interpret them by developing legal rules on a case-by-
case basis in the common law tradition” (quoting Guardians Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 641 n.12)). The 
Sherman Antitrust Act is a classic example. Id. 
 208.  See Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (holding that “Rule 52 
is . . . as binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress, and federal courts” cannot disregard the 
Rule any more than they can “disregard constitutional or statutory provisions”). 
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A statute built on the common law codifies a law developed by the 
courts over time.209 A codification of common law “might signal an 
implicit delegation to courts” to continue developing the doctrine.210 
Rule 6(e)’s general secrecy rule codified long-standing common law.211 
And a number of the rule’s amendments codified exceptions adopted 
by courts after the rule was first promulgated in 1944. For example, a 
1977 amendment added an exception allowing disclosure to 
government personnel necessary to assist a government attorney with 
the enforcement of criminal law.212 In the notes accompanying that 
amendment, the Advisory Committee cited In re William H. Pflaumer 
& Sons, Inc.,213 in which the judge allowed disclosure of grand jury 
materials to IRS agents in connection with an investigation.214 The 
Advisory Committee noted that the “trend seems to be in the direction 
of allowing disclosure” and codified the exception.215  
In addition to being derived from the common law, these statutes 
are written in broad, sweeping terms, leaving room for courts to 
develop the doctrine.216 One reading of the original 1944 Advisory 
 
 209.  See Lemos, supra note 206, at 98–99 (“Most of the statutes that appear regularly on the 
‘common law’ list codify legal principles that had been developed by the courts as common law.”). 
 210.  Id.; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 43–44 (1985) (explaining that, absent specific intent otherwise, Congress codifying 
common law should be understood as a delegation of common law power to courts). 
 211.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.B. 
 212.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s notes to 1977 amendment; 
In re Hastings, 735 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1984) (describing the development of this 
amendment), overruled by Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 20-224 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2020). See Hastings for another example 
regarding a 1983 amendment. Id. at 1268–69. 
 213.  In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
 214.  Id. at 476–77 (providing “IRS agents access to the records so long as they remain under 
the aegis of attorneys for the government”). When Pflaumer was decided, Rule 6(e) allowed 
disclosure “to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties.” FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 383 U.S. 1195, 1196 (1966), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at 1410 (1976) (superseded 
1977). But the focus was on attorney use, not on other government personnel. Pflaumer, and cases 
like it, allowed disclosure to nonattorney government personnel necessary to the attorney’s work. 
Allowing disclosure to nonattorney government personnel was a recognition of the realities of 
the attorneys’ work, but it was also a new exception to the secrecy norm. Seeing this trend, the 
Advisory Committee proposed to codify the exception into what is now Rule 6(e)(A)(ii). See 
generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee’s note to proposed 1977 amendment. The 
committee’s proposal prompted Congress to rewrite Rule 6(e), but the rewriting ultimately 
included this new exception. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 215.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee’s notes to 1977 amendment. See supra note 
214 for the history of the Advisory Committee’s proposed adoption of the rule, followed by 
Congress’s rewriting. 
 216.  See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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Committee Notes indicates the rule invited courts to further develop 
grand jury secrecy rules in precisely this way.217 However, two 
considerations suggest that the current version of the rule is no longer 
written in broad, sweeping terms and no longer invites judge-made 
exceptions. First, as discussed earlier,218 Congress rewrote Rule 6(e) in 
1977 because the rule did “not clearly spell out when, under what 
circumstances, and to whom grand jury information can be 
disclosed.”219 The resulting rule included limiting language both with 
the general secrecy rule and with the exceptions, limiting disclosures to 
those listed in the rule.220 Thus, Congress’s intent to write a clear, 
specific rule may indicate that the 1977 rewriting was a break with the 
sentiment expressed in the 1944 Notes.  
Second, the current language of the rule is detailed and specific. 
The general secrecy requirement includes limiting language pointing 
the reader forward to a set of specific, enumerated exceptions. The 
exceptions differentiate between those circumstances requiring judicial 
authorization and those that do not,221 provide a specific set of rules 
governing disclosure for use in foreign intelligence and national 
security,222 provide for disclosure from one grand jury to another,223 and 
define cases in which those who receive disclosure are bound to 
secrecy.224 And finally, the rule covers many instances where courts 
might authorize disclosure for the purposes of administrability.225 This 
 
 217.  The notes accompanying the original 1944 rules stated that Rule 6(e) “continues the 
traditional practice of secrecy on the part of members of the grand jury, except when a court 
permits a disclosure.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee’s note to 1944 rules. Some courts 
have interpreted the line “except when a court permits a disclosure” to be an invitation for courts 
to recognize new exceptions to grand jury secrecy when appropriate. See, e.g., Carlson v. United 
States, 837 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that the history of the rule and the same phrase 
from 1944 committee notes supported the court’s conclusion that it could authorize disclosure 
outside the rule). 
 218.  See supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text.  
 219.  See H.R. REP. NO. 95-195, at 5 (1977) (noting the concerns of the House Judiciary 
Committee); supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 220.  See supra notes 117–118 18 and accompanying text. 
 221.  Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A) (permitting certain disclosures without judicial 
authorization), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E) (listing disclosures requiring the court’s 
permission). 
 222.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D). 
 223.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C). 
 224.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B)(vii). 
 225.  See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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specificity suggests courts should no longer treat Rule 6(e) as a 
common law statute.226  
Many statutes leave gaps or ambiguous language implying a 
delegation of rulemaking authority to courts.227 But that is categorically 
different than the type of language and rulemaking in focus here.228 
Creating an exception to Rule 6(e) to allow disclosure of historically 
significant grand jury materials, for example, does not resolve an 
ambiguous term or fill an obvious gap that currently exists in the rule.  
Further, cases decided before the promulgation of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure now carry a different weight, to the extent 
their holdings conflict with the rules.229 For example, United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,230 decided four years before the creation of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, held that “after the grand 
jury’s functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends 
of justice require it.”231 Rule 6(e) neither places a time limit on grand 
jury secrecy nor does it include an exception for disclosure where “the 
ends of justice require it.”232 Instead, the original 1944 rule established 
exceptions to grand jury secrecy specifying which ends warrant it.  
The 1944 rule gave courts discretion to authorize disclosure 
“preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding,”233 an 
 
 226.  See McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (reasoning that Rule 6(e)’s 
specificity supports reading the rule as exhaustive, foreclosing the use of inherent authority), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 597 (2020); see also Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226, 1236 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(en banc) (saying the exceptions cannot be “merely precatory” because “[i]t is hard to imagine 
why Congress and the Rules Committee would bother to craft and repeatedly amend these 
detailed exceptions if they were meant only to be an illustration” and not exhaustive), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 20-224 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2020).  
 227.  See Lemos, supra note 206, at 95 (stating that in the absence of a governing agency, 
judges are left with the job of filling gaps and resolving ambiguities in statutes). 
 228.  See id. at 90 (arguing the differences between developing a common law statute and 
merely resolving ambiguity and filling gaps is one of degree, not of categorical difference). 
 229.  Regarding the “bootstrapping rule” in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), the 
Court stated that “Glasser . . . w[as] decided before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in 1975,” which “now govern the treatment of evidentiary questions in federal courts.” 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 177–78 (1987).  
 230.  United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
 231.  Id. at 234; accord Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 762 (7th Cir. 2016).  
 232.  Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 234. 
 233.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 826, 837–38 (1946) (superseded 1966) (“[A] juror, 
attorney, interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the grand 
jury . . . when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial 
proceeding . . . .”). 
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exception that still exists today.234 After the rules went into effect, the 
Court continued to use the “ends of justice” language, but then in 
connection with the judicial-proceedings exception. For example, in 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,235 the Court authorized 
disclosure of grand jury materials to defense counsel for use on cross-
examination.236 The Court said that a judge could exercise discretion to 
allow grand jury minutes to be used at trial when the “ends of justice 
require it.”237 As an example of that longstanding use, the Court cited 
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,238 which examined a request for 
discovery of grand jury materials in a civil case, that is, in a specific type 
of judicial proceeding.239 Although the Court has continued to use 
language from cases predating the rules, this does not necessarily 
indicate that Rule 6(e) is a common law statute. Rather, the use of the 
language changed, becoming a way to define when courts should allow 
disclosure pursuant to the enumerated exceptions requiring judicial 
authorization.240 Thus, although Rule 6(e) has historically been shaped 
by court precedent, the current rule is sufficiently different from the 
original 1944 rule that courts should hesitate before relying on the 
rule’s common law history as a source of authority to formulate new 
exceptions.241 
 
 234.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E) (“The court may authorize disclosure . . . preliminarily to 
or in connection with a judicial proceeding . . . .”). 
 235.  Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959). For a similar discussion 
of this case, see Gonzalez-Rivas, supra note 32, at 1683–85. 
 236.  Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 360 U.S. at 400. 
 237.  Id. (quoting Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 234). 
 238.  United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). 
 239.  See id. at 678 (describing how defendants moved for discovery of grand jury minutes to 
use in preparation for trial). 
 240.  See McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842, 846 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining that Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass “plainly fell within the exception for use ‘in connection with a judicial proceeding’” 
(quoting Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 360 U.S. at 396 n.1), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 597 (2020))); Pitch v. 
United States, 953 F.3d 1226, 1238 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (same), petition for cert. filed, No. 
20-224 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2020). But see Pitch, 953 F.3d at 1251, 1254 (Wilson, J., dissenting) 
(referencing Pittsburgh Plate Glass for the proposition that Rule 6 simply declares the common 
law rule that judges have discretion to order disclosure of grand jury materials). However, the 
particularized need test, see supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text, may have replaced the 
“ends of justice” analysis. Even so, the particularized need test is only invoked once a party has 
requested disclosure under one of the rule’s enumerated exceptions. 
 241.  For a different view of how Rule 6(e)’s common law history influences courts’ 
supervisory authority, but which ultimately arrives at the same conclusion, see Gonzalez-Rivas, 
supra note 32, at 1682–83 (describing a “common law plus” conception of Rule 6(e) in which the 
rule codified the common law rules and thus “absorbed [any inherent] power” to authorize 
disclosure of otherwise secret materials (citing 2 SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW, 
FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 18:2 (West 2d ed. 2019))). 
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In sum, courts have relied on inherent authority to authorize 
disclosure outside of the rule. They cite the rule’s common law history 
as an invitation to do so in the absence of an explicit statement limiting 
their inherent authority, and they cite Rule 57(b) as further 
permission.242 However, the grand jury’s independence, the Court’s 
restrictions on the use of inherent authority, and the uncertainty of 
Rule 6(e)’s status as a common law statute make it unclear that courts 
can justifiably rely on inherent authority to authorize disclosure 
outside the bounds of the rule.  
IV.  A RESIDUAL EXCEPTION TO RULE 6(E) 
Regardless of whether courts may authorize disclosure outside of 
the enumerated exceptions, there may be instances where the need for 
disclosure for the sake of the public interest is so great or the interests 
of grand jury secrecy so diminished that disclosure might be warranted 
even when Rule 6(e) does not provide for it. Although the policy 
considerations that justify disclosure will vary with the circumstances, 
the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules should clarify the law and 
provide flexibility and discretion to judges to address these situations 
by amending Rule 6(e). This Part surveys efforts to change the rule 
before arguing that the Advisory Committee should adopt a residual 
exception to the rule. It concludes by illustrating how a residual 
exception would function by reprising the earlier examples of requests 
for disclosure by Stuart McKeever and Congress. 
A. Proposed Amendments to Rule 6(e) 
In 2011, then-Attorney General Eric Holder proposed that the 
Advisory Committee amend Rule 6(e) to include an exception for 
materials of historical interest.243 Holder explained that none of the 
rule’s enumerated exceptions authorized the disclosure of grand jury 
records “based solely on the records’ historical significance,”244 but he 
argued that current doctrine allowing courts “unbounded discretion” 
 
 242.  This Note, however, argues for a different reading of Rule 6(e)’s text. See supra Part II. 
If correct, Rule 6(e)’s limiting language may foreclose a line of reasoning that relies on Rule 57(b) 
as a source of authority. 
 243.  Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr.,  Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to the Hon. Reena 
Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc. 5–9 (Oct. 18, 2011), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/11-CR-C.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP9L-
R47H]. 
 244.  Id. at 2–3.  
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to “entertain motions for disclosure under their inherent authority” 
was “untenable.”245 Thus, he proposed adding an exception for 
historically significant grand jury records.  
Holder’s proposal contained several components. First, it divided 
records into separate age categories. Courts would not be able to hear 
requests for disclosure of records younger than thirty years old.246 
Records older than thirty years but younger than seventy-five years 
could be disclosed after a judge “determine[d] that the requirements 
of grand-jury secrecy are outweighed by the records’ historical 
significance.”247 Records seventy-five years or older would 
automatically become available to the public under the standards for 
public records used by the National Archives and Records 
Administration (“NARA”), which would house the records.248  
For those records in the thirty- to seventy-five-year age category, 
the proposal required courts, before authorizing disclosure, to find by 
a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the moving party only sought 
archived grand jury materials; (2) the materials have “exceptional” 
historical significance; (3) the case files have been closed for at least 
thirty years; (4) “no living person would be materially prejudiced by 
disclosure, or that any prejudice could be avoided through redactions” 
or other reasonable means; (5) “disclosure would not impede any 
pending government investigation or prosecution;” and (6) there is no 
other public interest that warrants continued secrecy.249 In addition, 
Holder maintained that these specific factors would not preclude 
looking at additional criteria, such as those already established in case 
law.250 
 
 245.  Id. at 5. 
 246.  Id. at 6, 9. 
 247.  Id. at 6. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id. at 9. 
 250.  Id. at 7. Holder refers to In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), as listing factors 
considered in “the paradigm examples of disclosure to date,” such as the releases of “the Nixon, 
Rosenberg, and Hiss grand-jury testimony.” Id. Craig provides the following “non-exhaustive” 
list:  
(i) the identity of the party seeking disclosure; (ii) whether the defendant to the grand 
jury proceeding or the government opposes the disclosure; (iii) why disclosure is being 
sought in the particular case; (iv) what specific information is being sought for 
disclosure; (v) how long ago the grand jury proceedings took place; (vi) the current 
status of the principals of the grand jury proceedings and that of their families; (vii) the 
extent to which the desired material—either permissibly or impermissibly—has been 
previously made public; (viii) whether witnesses to the grand jury proceedings who 
might be affected by disclosure are still alive; and (ix) the additional need for 
maintaining secrecy in the particular case in question. 
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Upon consideration, the Advisory Committee decided not to 
amend the rule.251 In the discussion, the Committee noted that cases 
requesting disclosure were relatively rare, that district courts had 
appropriately resolved the cases under their inherent authority,252 and 
that creating a nationally applicable rule was premature.253 In addition, 
the subcommittee was concerned that creating a presumption of public 
availability after seventy-five years would be a major change to the 
presumption that grand jury records would always be “secret absent an 
extraordinary showing in a particular case.”254 And the subcommittee 
members agreed that NARA should not be “the gatekeeper for grand 
jury materials.”255 
After the Advisory Committee declined to act on Holder’s 
proposal, the issue laid relatively dormant until 2020. When the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in McKeever v. Barr, Justice Breyer 
wrote separately to highlight the question of courts’ inherent authority 
to disclose grand jury materials outside of Rule 6(e).256 Noting that the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision created a circuit split, Justice Breyer wrote that 
“[w]hether district courts retain authority to release grand jury 
material outside those situations specifically enumerated in the 
Rules . . . is an important question. It is one I think the Rules 
Committee both can and should revisit.”257 Shortly after Justice Breyer 
issued this statement, the Eleventh Circuit deepened the circuit split 
when it handed down Pitch v. United States.258 The court’s en banc 
decision overruled earlier precedent to hold that Rule 6(e) is 
 
Id. at 106. 
 251.  Memorandum from the Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of 
Crim. Proc., to the Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. 20 
(May 17, 2012), in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - JUNE 2012, at 629, 
648 (2012) [hereinafter Hon. Reena Raggi Memorandum], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/fr_import/ST2012-06_Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/GEG6-3H47] (agenda book). 
 252.  Of course, this conclusion assumes the propriety of courts authorizing disclosure under 
their inherent authority. As this Note argues, however, that assumption may not be as settled as 
the Committee’s conclusion indicates. See supra Part III. 
 253.  Hon. Reena Raggi Memorandum, supra note 251.  
 254.  Advisory Comm. on Crim. Rules, Draft Minutes 7 (Apr. 22–23, 2012), in COMMITTEE 
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - JUNE 2012, supra note 251, at 653, 659. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  McKeever v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 597, 597–98 (2020) (statement of Breyer, J.). 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226, 1241 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 20-224 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2020). 
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exhaustive and exclusive and that district courts do not have inherent 
authority to act outside its bounds.259 
At the same time, the Public Citizen Litigation Group and the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, on behalf of 
themselves and other organizations, separately proposed amendments 
to Rule 6(e). First, the Public Citizen Litigation Group proposed 
amending Rule 6(e) along the same lines as the Holder proposal.260 
This new proposal was nearly identical to Holder’s proposal except 
that it shifted the time frames involved. It would allow a court to 
authorize disclosure, under the same factors, after twenty years, not 
thirty, and would allow records to become public after sixty years.261  
Second, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, on 
behalf of a number of news organizations, also proposed that the 
Advisory Committee amend Rule 6(e).262 Instead of following the 
Holder proposal, the Reporters Committee’s proposal was 
significantly broader, since it would apply both to historical records and 
to other issues of “public interest.”263 It is thus more like a residual 
exception of the type this Note advocates rather than an exception 
focused only on historical materials. As criteria for authorizing 
disclosure, the Reporters Committee proposed using the factors from 
the balancing test announced by the Second Circuit in In re Craig.264 
Those factors include considerations such as who is seeking disclosure, 
“whether the defendant to the grand jury proceeding or the 
government opposes the disclosure,” “why disclosure is being sought,” 
“what specific information is being sought,” “how long ago the grand 
jury proceedings took place,” and whether witnesses to the 
proceedings might be affected by the disclosure.265 
 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  See Letter from Allison M. Zieve, Dir., Pub. Citizen Litig. Grp., to Rebecca A. 
Womeldorf, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. 10–11 (Mar. 2, 2020) [hereinafter Public 
Citizen Litigation Group Proposal], https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/PCLG-letter-to-
Rules-Committee.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ67-QLKF] (proposing an amendment to Rule 6(e)). 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Letter from Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press to Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Sec’y, 
Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. 1 (Apr. 7, 2020) [hereinafter Reporters Committee Proposal], 
https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/4.7.2020-RCFP-Letter-to-Advisory-Committee.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/RR2M-RZS2]. 
 263.  See id. at 7 (proposing to amend Rule 6(e)(3)(E) to permit disclosure “on petition of 
any interested person for reasons of historical or public interest”). 
 264.  Id. at 2.  
 265.  In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1997). For the full list, see supra note 250. 
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In addition to these proposed exceptions, both groups suggested 
adding a blanket statement in Rule 6 that would read, “Nothing in this 
Rule shall limit whatever inherent authority the district courts possess 
to unseal grand-jury records in exceptional circumstances.”266 
Although this general provision would supersede the textual 
indications that Rule 6(e) is the exclusive and exhaustive rule, it would 
not fully resolve the matter of inherent authority because it provides 
no affirmative grant of authority. By qualifying “inherent authority” 
with “whatever,” the proposed provision assumes, without deciding, 
that such inherent authority exists. Further, the term “whatever” leaves 
the quantum of authority indeterminate.267 As such, it provides no 
guidance on how much inherent authority district courts actually have 
over grand jury procedure. Because courts’ inherent authority to 
disclose grand jury materials outside of Rule 6(e) is unsettled and 
perhaps very limited,268 the proposed phrasing would do no more than 
push the question beyond the text of the rule itself. 
Thus, with respect to historically significant grand jury materials, 
the Public Citizen Litigation Group proposal would resolve the current 
circuit split. However, with respect to courts’ inherent authority to 
disclose grand jury materials in other circumstances,269 the proposal 
pushes the discussion beyond the text of the rule but does not clarify 
the law. Because of its broader scope, the Reporters Committee’s 
proposal functions more as a residual exception and so would be more 
successful since it would give courts not only guidance and clarity but 
an affirmative grant of authority in a wide range of circumstances. As 
a result, the need for a separate provision about inherent authority 
would be diminished, since it would only need to be invoked for 
circumstances not falling under the “historical or public interest.”270 
 
 266.  Compare Public Citizen Litigation Group Proposal, supra note 260, at 11 (“Nothing in 
this Rule shall limit whatever inherent authority the district courts possess to unseal grand-jury 
records in exceptional circumstances.”), with Reporters Committee Proposal, supra note 262 
(using nearly identical language). 
 267.  See Whatever, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/228087 
[https://perma.cc/4DT9-ZPTA] (defining whatever, when used “[a]s nominal relative, in a 
generalized or indefinite sense,” to be an adjective indicating “[a]ny . . . at all”). 
 268.  See supra Part III.B. 
 269.  Requests by Congress are an example of another circumstance where courts might be 
asked to rely on inherent authority but for which a clear grant of authority would be helpful. See 
infra Part IV.B.2. 
 270.  See Reporters Committee Proposal, supra note 262 (proposing an amendment granting 
explicit authority to disclose materials “of historical or public interest”). 
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B. Proposal for a Residual Exception 
The Advisory Committee should add a residual exception to Rule 
6(e) rather than an exception focused only on historical grand jury 
materials. A residual exception would provide courts with discretion to 
order disclosure of historically significant records and offer flexibility 
in other unforeseen circumstances. Residual exceptions are already 
used in other areas of the law, such as in the evidentiary hearsay 
rules.271 Adding one to Rule 6(e) would have the benefit of giving 
courts a clear, affirmative source of authority on which to rely when 
considering whether to authorize a disclosure not otherwise covered by 
an exception to Rule 6(e). Moreover, it would do so while avoiding the 
need for courts or the Advisory Committee to decide the source and 
scope of courts’ inherent authority over grand jury procedure. Finally, 
adding a residual exception is important because unless a disclosure 
falls under an exception not requiring judicial authorization, all other 
disclosures must be authorized by the court. As a result, if there is no 
clear authority on which to authorize disclosure outside the current 
exceptions, some grand jury materials may remain secret despite great 
public interest in their disclosure. 
A residual exception would also guide courts and parties seeking 
disclosure about how to approach the decision. First, a residual 
exception could ask judges to consider whether disclosure would be 
contrary to the policies supporting grand jury secrecy.272 This ensures 
that the disclosure would not contravene implicit rules vital to the 
grand jury’s core functioning.273 Second, the rule could ask courts to 
consider whether disclosure would serve the “ends of justice,”274 
invoking the language used by the Supreme Court both before and 
after the original promulgation of Rule 6(e).275 Finally, the rule could 
require courts to use the particularized need test, thus keeping the 
exception consistent with the way disclosures under the other 
exceptions are already adjudicated. The moving party would have to 
show that the need for continued disclosure outweighs the need for 
 
 271.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 807 (providing a “Residual Exception” and allowing admission 
of otherwise inadmissible hearsay if a judge determines the hearsay to be sufficiently probative 
and trustworthy). 
 272.  See supra Introduction (listing policies underlying grand jury secrecy). 
 273.  This factor attempts to bring the residual exception within the guidance given by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Williams. For a discussion of Williams, see supra Part III.B. 
 274.  United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940). 
 275.  See supra Part III.C. 
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secrecy and that the request is tailored to include only the materials 
needed.276 This balancing test encompasses the considerations set out 
in Craig, but expressly stating those factors in Rule 6(e) might provide 
greater clarity.277 
Reprising two earlier examples illustrates how a residual 
exception could operate.  
1. Stuart McKeever’s Request for Disclosure.  A residual exception 
could have been used to decide whether to release grand jury materials 
to Stuart McKeever to aid his research into the murder of Professor 
Galíndez. First, disclosure of sixty-year-old grand jury materials 
probably would not undermine any core rules necessary to the 
functioning of a grand jury. After all, the investigation into Agent 
Frank had long finished, and most people associated with the case are 
probably no longer alive. However, setting a precedent that materials 
might be disclosed, even after sixty years, could make witnesses in 
future investigations less forthcoming and candid, thus impeding the 
functioning of future grand juries.  
Second, the ends of justice are served by disclosure. If the 
materials would help to solve the disappearance and murder of 
Professor Galíndez, then justice is served, even if it is long overdue. 
Finally, if McKeever’s request was tailored specifically to materials 
pertaining to Professor Galíndez or circumstances surrounding his 
disappearance and murder, and McKeever could show that such 
information was not reasonably obtainable by some other source, then 
there would be a particularized need for disclosure. In this case, 
analysis under a residual exception would probably favor disclosure, 
especially given the age of the materials in question. 
2. Requests for Disclosure by Congress.  Requests for disclosure of 
more contemporaneous grand jury information could also be 
considered under a residual exception. For example, the need for 
Congress to have access to grand jury materials for the sake of an 
investigation might be important to the public interest. Yet there is no 
general exception allowing disclosure to Congress within Rule 6(e). 
Currently, Congress’s primary access to grand jury materials is through 
 
 276.  Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979). Though the 
Douglas Oil test has a prong for whether the material “is needed to avoid a possible injustice in 
another judicial proceeding,” this prong would unduly narrow a residual exception. Id.  
 277.  For a list of the Craig factors, see supra note 250. 
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an impeachment inquiry—such as those of Presidents Nixon and 
Trump—which courts have held to fall under the exception allowing 
disclosure preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial 
proceeding.278  
Yet there may be other times when it would be valuable, and in 
the public interest, for Congress to have access to grand jury records.279 
Although Congress has its own broad investigative power and could 
have the same witnesses testify that appeared before the grand jury,280 
disclosure of grand materials might still be warranted. For instance, an 
impeachment is a grave undertaking. Allowing a House committee to 
see a select portion of grand jury materials in advance of an inquiry 
might either justify or allay concerns that the impeachment inquiry is 
necessary. But this might not fall under an exception in Rule 6(e) 
because it might not yet be preliminary to a judicial proceeding.  
Congress might also seek disclosure of grand jury materials 
outside the impeachment context. For example, in the late 1970s, the 
Department of Justice used a grand jury to investigate whether Gulf 
Oil was in violation of the Sherman Act for participating in uranium 
price fixing.281 Although prosecutors recommended indictments, the 
grand jury returned none. Instead, an information was filed against the 
company, which pleaded nolo contendere to a misdemeanor violation 
of the Act.282 Concerned about this outcome, the Senate Judiciary 
 
 278.  See, e.g., In re Application of Comm. on the Judiciary, 414 F. Supp. 3d 129, 137, 147, 182 
(D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 951 F.3d 589 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (authorizing disclosure of Mueller grand jury 
materials to the House Judiciary Committee in connection with its impeachment inquiry 
regarding President Trump), cert. granted, No. 19-1328,  2020 WL 3578680 (U.S. July 2, 2020); see 
also Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714, 716–17 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (suggesting that disclosure of grand jury materials to the House during 
Watergate could be justified as “being made ‘preliminarily to [and] in connection with a judicial 
proceeding’” (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 383 U.S. 1195, 1196 (1966), 
reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. at 1410 (1976) (superseded 1977))); McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842, 
847 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (adopting Judge MacKinnon’s view in Haldeman), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
597 (2020). 
 279.  Rule 6(e)(3)(D) authorizes disclosure, without needing judicial authorization, of foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence related to “federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, 
immigration, national defense, or national security official[s].” FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D). 
Members of Congress may perhaps fit under this exception in some situations. 
 280.  See FOSTER, supra note 8, at 35–36 (surveying Congress’s investigative power). 
 281.  William E. Weinberger, Note, Congressional Access to Grand Jury Transcripts, 33 STAN. 
L. REV. 155, 155 (1980). 
 282.  Id. For context, an “information” is a criminal charge brought by a prosecutor without 
an indictment by a grand jury. See Information, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In 
the federal context, misdemeanors can be charged by indictment, information, or complaint. See 
FED. R. CRIM. P. (7)(a)(1)(B), 58(b)(1). 
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Subcommittee on Antitrust investigated whether foreign government 
influence or some limitation in antitrust law had prevented the grand 
jury from returning felony indictments.283 The subcommittee brought 
Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield to testify before the full 
Senate Judiciary Committee.284 Shenefield refused to discuss the 
investigation, citing grand jury secrecy.285 The District Court for the 
District of Columbia then denied disclosure of grand jury records to 
the Judiciary Committee on grounds that it did not fit within any 
enumerated exception.286 
If this were happening now, disclosure to investigate foreign 
government influence might fall under the exception allowing 
disclosure of matters related to foreign intelligence and national 
security.287 However, this would not cover materials related to defects 
in antitrust law. Under a residual exception, a court could consider this 
request. Whether the ends of justice favored disclosure might turn on 
whether the congressional investigation was connected to a “valid 
legislative purpose.”288 Further, the court could consider whether the 
request was tailored to the legislative purpose and whether similar 
information could not be obtained from other sources, thus indicating 
a particularized need for the disclosure. Finally, the court could weigh 
whether disclosure to Congress would impair the proper functioning of 
the grand jury. In this case, it would probably be a close call. On the 
one hand, disclosure might chill corporate cooperation with grand jury 
proceedings and lead to less than full and frank testimony in the future. 
On the other hand, a disclosure tailored to Congress’s needs might 
minimize the adverse impact on future grand juries. 
 
 283.  Weinberger, supra note 281, at 155. 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. at 156–57. 
 287.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D). This was added in 2002 as part of the USA PATRIOT Act 
of 2001. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D) advisory committee’s notes to 2002 amendment. 
 288.  FOSTER, supra note 8, at 35–36. Foster notes that although in other contexts a “valid 
legislative purpose” may protect a congressional committee from judicial scrutiny under the 
Speech and Debate Clause, this has only twice been successfully used to justify disclosing grand 
jury materials. Id. 35–39 (first citing In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 
1299, 1307 (M.D. Fla. 1977); and then citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Grand Jury No. 81-
1 (Miami), 669 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (S.D. Fla. 1987)). Foster further notes that the D.C. Circuit 
and the Department of Justice take the position that grand jury materials may only be released 
to Congress if Rule 6(e) permits. Id. at 38–39. Because in other contexts a valid legislative purpose 
gives weight to congressional investigations, analysis under a residual exception might properly 
consider whether Congress’s request is in pursuit of such a purpose. 
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CONCLUSION 
Secrecy is a long-standing part of grand jury procedure and is 
integral to its proper functioning. Although grand jury secrecy began 
as a common law rule, it is now codified in Rule 6(e), which, by its text 
and evolution, covers the field of grand jury secrecy and the departures 
from it. Beyond Rule 6(e), courts have limited inherent authority to 
craft new exceptions to the rule. Nevertheless, historical and current 
practice in many circuits is to authorize disclosure outside the rule 
when, in the judge’s discretion, such disclosure is warranted. The 
tension this creates between doctrine and practice renders the law of 
grand jury secrecy unsettled. The Advisory Committee should settle 
the law by adding a residual exception to Rule 6(e). Doing so would 
provide a clear grant of authority for courts to authorize disclosure 
while also giving courts and litigants guidance on what to consider 
when making a disclosure determination. 
 
